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Abstract 
This paper applies a previously developed sensor data qualification technique to a commercial aircraft 
engine simulation known as the Commercial Modular Aero-Propulsion System Simulation 40,000 
(C-MAPSS40k). The sensor data qualification technique is designed to detect, isolate, and accommodate 
faulty sensor measurements. It features sensor networks, which group various sensors together and relies 
on an empirically derived analytical model to relate the sensor measurements. Relationships between all 
member sensors of the network are analyzed to detect and isolate any faulty sensor within the network.  
I. Introduction 
Sensor fault detection and isolation algorithms increase the reliability of systems by enabling the 
early detection and removal of faulty data from the control system. Undetected sensor faults can impact 
the performance of closed loop systems that rely on these sensor measurements; therefore the ability to 
remove faulty sensor data prior to control action is desired to preserve the fidelity of the system. 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has previously explored sensor fault 
detection, isolation, and accommodation algorithms for jet engines. A survey of previous techniques has 
been provided by Merrill (Ref. 1). Fault detection and isolation schemes rely on redundant information to 
determine if a sensor measurement is valid. The redundant information can be a measurement obtained 
from a duplicate sensor, known as physical or direct redundancy, current or successive measurement 
samples from a single sensor, known as temporal redundancy, or estimated measurement information 
produced by a reference model which describe the expected behavior, known as analytical redundancy 
(Ref. 2). Common temporal redundancy checks include rate checks, which ensure that the derivative of 
the sensor data is less than a predetermined maximum value. Analytical redundancy relies on the use of 
models, such as linear mapping techniques and/or observers, to produce an estimated value that is used to 
determine if the data is acceptable. 
The NASA advanced detection, isolation, and accommodation program focused on improving the 
overall system reliability of aircraft engines through the use of analytical redundancy methods (Refs. 3 
and 4). The applied analytical redundancy method, referred to as an accommodation filter, uses a set of 
optimized engine estimates to isolate the faulty sensor. This approach can remove the faulty measure-
ments from further use, and in some cases can replace the faulty measurements with estimated values as 
part of the accommodation algorithm. The estimated sensor measurements are created from a Kalman 
filter that incorporates a simplified engine model. 
Another proposed approach is to simply select a “safe” measurement when two physically redundant 
channels disagree (Ref. 5). Consider a fan speed controlled engine that includes two physically redundant 
fan speed sensors, either of which may fail high or low. The existence of a sensor fault can be detected by 
comparing the measurements from the two sensors, but without an independent third channel it is not 
possible to isolate which of the two sensors is faulty. In such a scenario, the safe accommodation action 
would be to select the high sensor measurement for controlling the engine. If the fan speed sensor fails 
low, and the lower value is selected, the engine could over speed; resulting in a potentially catastrophic 
turbo machinery failure. However, if the larger value is selected and the fan speed sensor fails high, the 
engine will decrease its speed and power, but this is not a catastrophic event. It is noted in Reference 5, 
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that the effectiveness of this strategy deteriorates if the sensor fault is so large that the engine would shut 
down. To help avoid this situation, Reference 5 proposes a fuzzy-logic-based approach with the use of a 
third analytical measurement from a real time engine model. 
Recently, NASA in conjunction with Expert Microsystem Inc., has developed a new sensor fault 
detection, isolation, and accommodation approach referred to as the Sensor Data Qualification (SDQ) 
system. SDQ has been designed for future automated and human in the loop space systems (Refs. 6 to 8). 
The SDQ approach features an analytical redundancy network to determine the state of the individual 
sensors in the network. Relationships are defined between all member sensors in the network. The 
number of failed relationships for each member sensor is tracked and used to detect and isolate the faulty 
sensor; the number of failed relationships must be greater than some number, which is predetermined and 
based on the number of validated sensors. Once a sensor is identified as faulty, the sensor is removed 
from the network. 
The work presented in this paper focuses on applying the analytical network of SDQ to a commercial 
aircraft engine simulation with the goal of diagnosing and accommodating faulty sensor measurements to 
preserve the accuracy of the sensor measurement reported to the controller. Due to weight restrictions, 
only dual channel systems are being considered in this study. This study assumes that the sensors are fully 
operational at the beginning of a flight and is limited to a single sensor failure. Section II discusses the 
SDQ approach. The commercial aircraft simulation that is being used to demonstrate and test the SDQ 
approach is discussed in Section III. Tuning of the SDQ algorithms is discussed in Section IV. Simulation 
results are shown in Section V with conclusions in Section VI. 
Nomenclature 
A    Reference made to the first channel of a redundant system 
ARC    Analytical Redundant Channel 
B    Reference made to the second channel of a redundant system 
C-MAPSS40k  Commercial Modular Aero-Propulsion System Simulation 40,000 
i    Measurement grouping, such as Fan speed sensors 
tijarc    Analytical redundancy check limit between measurement i and measurement j 
timax    Maximum limit for measurement i 
timin    Minimum limit for measurement i 
tirate    Maximum limit for the derivative of measurement i 
tircc    Redundant channel check limit for measurement i 
j    Measurement j of an analytical redundancy network 
k    Analytical model linear relationship factor 
NASA    National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Nc    Core speed (rpm) 
NcR    Corrected core speed (rpm) 
Nf    Fan speed (rpm) 
NfR    Corrected fan speed (rpm) 
PLA    Power Lever Angle (degrees) 
Ps3    High pressure compressor discharge static pressure (psi) 
P2    Inlet pressure (psi) 
P50    Low pressure turbine discharge pressure (psi) 
rpm    Revolutions per minute 
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rixjy   Residual for analytical network relation between measurements i sensor channel x and 
j sensor channel y  
SDQ    Sensor Data Qualification 
T2    Inlet temperature (° Rankine) 
T30    High pressure compressor discharge temperature (° Rankine) 
T50    Low pressure turbine discharge temperature (° Rankine) 
x    Reference to a channel of sensor i 
y      Reference to a channel of sensor j 
II. Application of Sensor Data Qualification 
The Sensor Data Qualification (SDQ) application is a multi-layered system consisting of 
reasonableness checks, analytical redundancy checks, and additional logic to minimize false alarms. One 
factor in the reduction of false alarms, for this application, is accomplished by the execution of individual 
sensor checks before performing more complex analytical redundancy checks. The analytical redundancy 
checks utilize multiple sensors as inputs and are only processed once all the incoming data has been 
determined to be reasonable by the individual sensor checks. This sequence of operations minimizes the 
impact of corrupted data on the analytical networks. A high level flowchart showing the information flow 
through the components that comprise the SDQ architecture is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.—Flow chart showing the 
high level operation of the applied 
SDQ algorithm. 
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During each time step, or execution, the SDQ algorithm receives the incoming sensor measurement 
data and then performs the reasonableness checks, (i.e., range and rate checks), on each individual sensor. 
If a reasonableness check fails for an individual sensor, the sensor is flagged for the current time step. If a 
sensor is flagged, no other calculations involving the sensor will be performed during the current time 
step. After the reasonableness checks, the analytical redundancy checks are performed for networks that 
contain sufficient qualified and non-flagged sensors to assess the remaining network sensors. The 
persistency check requires that a sensor be flagged for a defined number of consecutive executions prior 
to being disqualified. This is done to prevent a sensor being disqualified for random bad data points, or 
outliers. In this application, each individual sensor has an associated strike counter to track the number of 
consecutive executions that it has been flagged. An assumption is made that only a single sensor can be 
flagged as faulty at any given time step, otherwise detection of multiple sensor faults by the SDQ checks 
is an indication of a process change within the system. If a single sensor is flagged, the corresponding 
strike counter is incremented during the persistency checks. If the strike counter reaches its limit, the 
sensor is disqualified. If, prior to reaching its strike counter limit, a qualified sensor is not flagged on any 
subsequent time step its strike counter is reset to zero. In addition, if multiple sensors are flagged as faulty 
during a single time step, the strike counter for all qualified and flagged sensors are reset to zero as well. 
In this situation, it is assumed that the engine is operating at a mode outside the region the SDQ network 
of checks was designed to monitor and the data is good. The final step of SDQ is the qualification and 
consolidation subsystem, which is responsible for qualifying and consolidating the sensor data. During 
normal operation with no flagged or disqualified sensors, the data reported to the controller in this study 
is the average value of the Channels A and B sensor measurements. Once a sensor is identified as 
disqualified by reaching the strike count limit, the sensor measurement is removed from all further 
calculations. In this case, the value reported to the controller would be the measurement from the 
remaining good channel. Note that in this study, the possibility of more than one sensor fault is not 
considered. The remainder of this section will discuss the algorithms used for the reasonableness checks 
and the analytical redundancy checks. 
A. Reasonableness Checks 
The reasonableness checks are designed to identify gross faults such as a short or open circuit in the 
sensor path that result in an unrealistic sensor measurement. Depending on the sensor, these faults can 
manifest themselves as a very large negative or positive measurement, a zero, or any other measurement 
that would not be physically possible, for example a negative pressure or temperature measurement in the 
turbine section of an engine. Reasonableness checks establish limits or thresholds to be applied to each 
data sample from the sensor. These limits can be established at the extreme measurement ranges of the 
sensor or they can be adjusted to detect a measurement outside the operational envelope resulting in 
quicker detection, but also increasing the potential for a false detection. Two common checks to protect 
against these types of faults are range checks and rate checks.  
The range check ensures that the incoming sensor data each time step is within known minimum and 
maximum limits, or: 
 max/min iBAi tit   (1) 
Where i is the measurement, such as the compressor discharge pressure, compressor discharge 
temperature, etc., the subscripts A/B refers to the sensor channels being tested, both channels are tested 
separately denoted by (A/B), and timin and timax are the minimum and maximum limits for the measurement, 
i. The range check is mainly intended to detect a hard sensor fault, such as a short or open circuit, when 
the value being reported is outside the expected range. 
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The rate check ensures that the absolute value of the incoming data’s derivative is below some 
maximum limit: 
 irateBAdt
di ti /  (2) 
Where tirate is the maximum derivative possible for the measurement i and can be implemented as either a 
time base derivative or change from the previous sample. This limit could be based on the physical 
capability of the physical sensor, or determined empirically from data. The rate check can aid in detecting 
small magnitude step changes, extremely noisy sensor signals, and intermittent signal behavior that can be 
due to either a loose connector or failing sensor. 
B. Analytical Redundancy Checks 
The analytical redundancy checks are intended to identify small magnitude and slow degrading sensor 
faults. These types of faults fall within the detection thresholds of the previously described reasonableness 
checks. The analytical redundancy check applied in this study is adapted from the SDQ technology that 
has been implemented for several space applications (Refs. 6 to 8). The SDQ analytical redundancy 
checks contain networks of sensors that have a strong relationship with one another. When all sensors 
within a given network are operating nominally, each of the sensor relationships are expected to be 
satisfied. However, in the event of a sensor fault, the faulty sensor can be identified by assessing which 
relationships are satisfied and which relationships are violated. A network relationship could involve two 
or more sensors, but in practice relationships typically involve only two sensors and while non-linear 
relationships are possible, linear relationships are sufficient, easier to develop and verify. These 
relationships are established either analytically or empirically based on derived knowledge of the system 
or process being controlled and available data. One method of defining the grouping of sensors and sensor 
relationships that comprise a sensor network is to use an automated software product known as 
SureSense. The SureSense Data Quality Validation Studio, developed by Expert Microsystems in 
conjunction with NASA Glenn Research Center, derives empirical relations for the network based on data 
through statistical analysis, pattern recognition, and neural networks. In this study, parameter relationships 
derived from an analytical model will be used to construct the sensor networks as described below.  
The first step in the analytical redundancy check is to determine if there is a mismatch between the 
two physically redundant sensors (Channels A and B): 
 irccBA tii   (3) 
where tircc is the redundant channel check limit for measurement i. If the relationship of Equation (3) is 
valid, then no further calculations are required since the redundant sensors are in agreement. However, if 
the relationship of Equation (3) fails, then additional checks are performed to determine which of the two 
physically redundant sensors is faulty. This is done by assessing the defined relationships that exist 
between measurement i and the other measurements included in the same network. These other sensed 
measurements are referred to here as relation sensors. The difference, or residuals, between each sensor i 
and its defined relationships are calculated for all member sensors of the network. For an analytical 
network comprised of two measurements, i and j, each with a redundant sensor Channels A and B, the 
residuals become: 
 
BijBji
BijAji
AijBji
AijAji
jkir
jkir
jkir
jkir
BB
BA
AB
AA




 (4) 
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where k is the linear relationship between measurement i and measurement j, which can be found from a 
linear model, piece-wise linear model, etc. Note that for each measurement i, there could be more than 
one relation measurement j, although only one is shown for the example presented in Equation (4). Each 
calculated residual is then compared to an analytical redundancy check limit (ijarc) to assess whether the 
defined relationship between measurements i and j is satisfied: 
 ijarcji tr yx   (5) 
Where x is the measurement i sensor channel and y is the relation measurement j sensor channel. For the 
example presented in Equation (4), a single measurement i sensor channel is flagged only if, that sensor 
fails its redundant channel check, both analytical redundancy checks containing the sensor fail, and at 
least one of the residuals of the measurement i redundant sensor channel satisfies its analytical 
redundancy check, or: 
 
 
 ijarcjiijarcjiijarcjiijarcjiirccBAB
ijarcjiijarcjiijarcjiijarcjiirccBAA
trortrandtrandtrandtiiififail
trortrandtrandtrandtiiififail
BAAABBAB
BBABBAAA


 (6) 
Additional logic is added to ensure that not more than one sensor can be identified, or flagged, as faulty 
from a single network at a current time step. In the case where more than one sensor is flagged as faulty, 
no sensor would be identified. This is to guard against incorrectly disqualifying a good sensor in the event 
that the system is operating outside its normal operational envelope. 
III. Commercial Aircraft Engine Simulation Testbed 
In this study, the SDQ fault detection, isolation, and accommodation system is applied to a 
commercial aircraft engine simulation known as the Commercial Modular Aero-Propulsion System 
Simulation 40,000 (C-MAPSS40k). C-MAPSS40k is a 40,000 lb thrust class, two spool, physics-based, 
component level, high bypass turbofan engine simulation and closed loop controller modeled in the 
Matlab/Simulink (The MathWorks, Inc.) environment (Refs. 9 and 10). The application of SDQ to 
the C-MAPSS40k architecture is shown in Figure 2. To simulate and test the SDQ approach, the 
C-MAPSS40k simulation is modified to allow for dual channel operation. A second set of sensor 
measurements, referred to as Channel B, has been added to the original set of sensors, Channel A, which  
 
 
Figure 2.—A block diagram of the Commercial Modular Aero-Propulsion System Simulation 
(C-MAPSS40k) configured for dual channel operation. The addition of a second set of sensor 
measurements and qualification and consolidation subsystems are shaded gray and the additional 
signal path is shown as a dashed line. 
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include the following measurements: high pressure compressor discharge static pressure and total 
temperature (Ps3 and T30), low pressure turbine discharge total pressure and total temperature (P50 and 
T50), fan speed (Nf) and core speed (Nc). The Channels A and B measurements are inputs to the 
qualification and consolidation subsystem. The qualification and consolidation subsystem calculates the 
average of the qualified Channels A and B sensors, and provides a single consolidated vector of measure-
ment values as feedback to the controller. The goal of SDQ is to correctly detect and isolate a single 
sensor fault on any of the engine’s dual channel sensors within the same flight that the fault occurred. 
IV. Algorithm Tuning 
To determine the limits for SDQ, a database of 500 flights at random takeoff conditions and 500 
flights at random cruise conditions with no faults are created. The range of the takeoff and cruise flight 
conditions are shown in Table 1. Each flight is a 30 sec simulation with two throttle movements. Half of 
the simulations at each flight condition consist of a burst and chop, where the simulation starts at the 
throttle low position, moves to the throttle high position at a simulation time of 10 sec, and returns to the 
throttle low position at a simulation time of 20 sec. The other simulations are a chop and burst, where the 
simulation starts in the throttle high position, moves to the throttle low position, and returns to the throttle 
high position with the same timing. White noise is added to the analog pressure and temperature sensor 
signals. 
A. Reasonableness Checks 
The range and rate check limits for each measurement is established by analyzing the nominal data to 
determine the extreme values, and setting the limits accordingly. The minimum range limit for a given 
measurement is determined by scaling the minimum value for all 1,000 flights by 0.75. Likewise the 
maximum range limit is determined by scaling the maximum value for all 1,000 flights by 1.25. The 
additional 25 percent scaling ensures that the range checks will not disqualify or remove data unless it is 
absolutely certain the data is out of range. The rate limit for each measurement is established by finding 
the maximum absolute value of the sample change of each measurement for all 1,000 flights. The range 
(min and max) and rate limit values are shown in Table 2 for the six sensor measurement types considered 
in this study. 
 
TABLE 1.—THE POSSIBLE RANGE FOR THE RANDOM 
TAKEOFF AND CRUISE NOMINAL FLIGHTS 
 Takeoff Cruise 
Altitude, ft 0 to 3,500 27,000 to 36,000 
Mach number 0.16 to 0.25 0.55 to 0.78 
Delta ambient temperature, °R –20 to 40 –5 to 5 
Engine degradation 50 hr to end of life 50 hr to end of life 
Throttle low, degrees 41 to 44 (Idle) 54 to 58 (Flight idle) 
Throttle high, degrees 76 to 80 (Takeoff) 60 to 68 (Cruise) 
 
 
TABLE 2.—THE REASONABLENESS CHECKS LIMITS DETERMINED FROM 
THE NOMINAL FLIGHT DATA AFTER SCALING 
Sensor 
measurement type 
Min limit, 
(tmin) 
Max limit, 
(tmax) 
Rate, 
(trate) 
Nf 1233, rpm 5325, rpm 20.8, rpm/sample 
Nc 6763, rpm 15594, rpm 42.4, rpm/sample 
Ps3 52, psi 579, psi 5.29, psi/sample 
P50 3.4, psi 31.5, psi 0.1292, psi/sample 
T30 726.7, °R 1966, °R 4.4, °R/sample 
T50 678, °R 2170, °R 14.2, °R/sample 
Nf 1233, rpm 5325, rpm 20.8, rpm/sample 
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Figure 3.—The relationship between the Ps3 redundant channel check limit, 
Ps3rcc, and the false positive rate. 
B. Analytical Redundancy Checks 
The analytical redundancy checks actually consist of a redundant channel check and an analytical 
network check based upon a sensor network (i.e., a defined grouping of sensors along with their defined 
interrelationships). Both of these checks are tuned independently, but collectively affect the performance 
of the analytical redundancy check. The redundant channel check, Equation (3), is the difference between 
the Channels A and B measurement. The redundant channel check limit, ircc, is set to maintain a maximum 
false positive rate (0.005 percent), the number of flights that the check is incorrectly violated divided by 
the total number of flights in which a fault was not present, and is determined from analyzing the nominal 
flight data. Simulations are executed using all the nominal flight data to determine the redundant channel 
check limit to meet the false positive rate requirement with the persistency check requirements (set to 3 
consecutive strikes), reducing the number of false alarms. Figure 3 shows the relationship between the 
Ps3 redundant channel check limit and the false positive rate. As the Ps3 sensor redundancy check limit 
decreases, smaller magnitude differences will be detected or flagged, but the false positive rate will also 
increase. 
The analytical network checks are more complex and require development of relationships between 
measurements. The measurements to be included in the analytical networks are: Nf, Nc, Ps3, P50, T30, 
and T50. In this implementation, it was chosen to have three fixed networks that consist of two different 
sensor measurements which are denoted as i and j. Three networks were designed, one for rotor speeds 
(i = Nf and j = Nc), one for pressure sensors (i = Ps3 and j = P50), and one for temperature sensors 
(i = T30 and j = T50). Grouping the sensors into networks based on the measurement type reduced the 
limits in the defined relationships between sensors due to differences in sensor dynamics and thereby 
provided increased sensitivity to sensor fault detection. Using a single i and j relationship of the analytical 
redundancy network, Equation (6), for the qualification of either measurement simplified the implementa-
tion. The reasonableness checks are executed for both i and j sensors and if any sensor fails these checks, 
then the associated analytical redundancy network processing is suspended. For the analytical redundancy 
checks, in this form, cross checks are performed on both i and j sensors and if one and only one of the 
measurements fails its’ cross check, then the remaining analytical redundancy network checks are applied 
to resolve the failed sensor. For example of the rotor speed network, if the Nc cross checks fail, the same 
analytical network relationships are used to determine the failed Nc sensor as would have been applied to 
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the Nf sensor failing its cross check. Equation (6) can be modified to return the failed j sensor if the j 
sensor fails the redundant channel check: 
 
 
 ijarcjiijarcjiijarcjiijarcjijrccBAB
ijarcjiijarcjiijarcjiijarcjijrccBAA
trortrandtrandtrandtjjifjfail
trortrandtrandtrandtjjifjfail
ABAABBBA
BBBAABAA


(7) 
 
Other options were considered for designing the analytical networks. One option was to group the 
sensors into two networks based on whether the sensor provided a measurement from either a low or high 
rotor location. For example, sensors for the low pressure compressor and low pressure turbine would be 
grouped with the fan speed sensor measurement, but the data showed that there would be larger limits in 
the defined sensor relationships based on this type of network, mainly due to a difference in dynamics 
associated with the sensors. 
Using the three network approach described above, there are two measurements in each network and 
therefore would resemble the network defined in the Equation (4). For example, the rotor speed network 
consists of both fan speed and core speed measurements. The goal is to determine a linear relationship 
factor (kij) that minimizes the difference between the two measurements, across all four sensor 
combinations. Figure 4 shows the relationship between corrected fan speed (NfR) and corrected core 
speed (NcR), shown as NfR/NcR on the y-axis and corrected fan speed on the x-axis for 20 of the 1,000 
nominal flights, displayed as the green region. Figure 4 also shows an approximation of the nominal flight 
data, determined using a least squares fit, that is to be used as the linear relationship factor, kij. The 
determined linear relationship factors, kij, are then archived to facilitate retrieval during SDQ execution 
via first order linear interpolation scheduled based on the corrected fan speed. For this application, the 
corrected fan speed value used for scheduling the interpolation is calculated using the average fan speed 
and average inlet temperature: 
 
  67.518/225.0
)(5.0
BA
BA
TT
NfNfNfR
	
	
  (8) 
 
Figure 4.—Example relationship between the linear relationship factor 
(kij) and nominal data based 20 flights for the rotor speed network. 
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The average corrected fan speed calculation shown in Equation (8) is applied to retrieve the kij 
information for all sensor types except for the fan speed sensors themselves. Note that the fan speed 
sensor affects all three networks since the model is based on corrected fan speed. For an individual fan 
speed sensor channel, only the opposite fan speed channel is used in scheduling the interpolation (not the 
average of both channels). This is done to guard against a fault in a fan speed sensor channel corrupting 
the calculation of the interpolation scheduling parameter. For example, a slow sensor drift in fan speed 
Channel A may be difficult to detect since the linear relationship factor will tend to follow the fault and 
may result in the good sensor being disqualified. Therefore, when calculating the Channel A fan speed 
residual, the linear relationship factor will be retrieved using the Channel B fan speed measurement only. 
During testing, it was observed that the incorrect fan speed sensor channel was disqualified 25 to 
33 percent of the time for a negative slow fan speed sensor drift. Additional logic was added to help 
address this issue. The additional logic is designed to flag a Channel A Nf fault when the two Channel A 
residuals are less than the analytical model limit and the two Channel B residuals are greater than the 
analytical model limit, and the residual between Nf Channels A and B is less than the redundant channel 
check limit. The opposite of this is flagged as a Channel B fault, or: 
 
 
ijarcjiijarcjiijarcjiijarcjiirccBAB
ijarcjiijarcjiijarcjiijarcjiirccBAA
trandtrandtrandtrandtiiififail
trandtrandtrandtrandtiiififail
BBABBAAA
BBABBAAA







 (9) 
This change is necessary since the linear relationship factor, kij, is determined using the corrected fan 
speed. A Nf fault affects the model relationships and will cause all the residuals in the network to fail. 
With the sensor network and relationships defined, the analytical redundancy check limit (ijarc) can be 
found. Ideally, the analytical redundancy check limit would be set to achieve a maximum false positive 
rate based on the nominal data; similar to the redundant channel check. The relationship between the 
analytical redundancy check limit and the false positive rate for the Ps3 sensor is shown in Figure 5. In 
Figure 5, the false positive rate does not always increase as the limit value decreases, and the false 
positive rate does not approach 100 percent as the limit reaches zero. Using the network approach 
requires that one sensor is identified as faulty against three other sensors, and if more than one sensor is 
 
 
Figure 5.—The relationship between the false positive rate and 
the analytical limit for the pressure sensor network limit using 
the Ps3 sensor. 
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TABLE 3.—THE ANALYTICAL NETWORK LIMITS 
Network Member sensor Redundant channel check limit Analytical redundancy check limit 
Rotor speed i = Nf, rpm 1.0 162.0 j = Nc, rpm 1.0 
Pressure i = Ps3, psi 1.2341 10.0 j = P50, psi 0.0513 
Temperature i = T30, °R 1.145 266.4 j = T50, °R 1.168 
 
identified as faulty, then no sensor is identified and the strike counters for all sensors are reset. As the 
analytical redundancy check limit decreases, there is more chance that the strike counters are reset due to 
more than one sensor failing the relationship; which explains the decrease in the false positive rate as the 
limit value decreases from 42 to 30.   
The approach taken in this study is to establish the analytical redundancy check limit to (1) minimize 
the false positive rate and (2) maximize the detection rate of a single sensor drift fault; for example a 
15 percent deviation of a single channel, which is slow enough not to be detected by the rate check. This 
approach allows for the limits to be set to include all known good nominal data and maximize the 
detection rate of faults of a target value. To start with, limits were adjusted to ensure that there were zero 
false alarms for the nominal 1,000 flight conditions and 100 percent corrected detections of a 15 percent 
deviation of the sensors from the pre-fault sensor value. Closed-loop simulations were run at a subset of 
the 1,000 nominal flight conditions, in this case 12 was arbitrarily chosen, to test the analytical 
redundancy limits and adjusted to maximize the correct detection rate. This process is repeated for all 
sensors in each network. The analytical network limits, which include the redundant channel check limits 
(non-adjusted) and analytical redundancy check limits (adjusted), are shown in Table 3. 
V. Simulation and Results 
With the SDQ system designed, three different types of faults are inserted into the closed loop 
C-MAPSS40k simulation: a step change, a slow sensor drift, and an intermittent signal. The sensor fault 
input profiles, shown as a percentage of the sensor fault magnitude, applied to generate the sensor faults 
are shown in Figure 6. The step and drift faults can be in the positive direction or in the negative 
direction. The step fault occurs within 0.015 sec, 1 time step, whereas the sensor drift takes 50 sec to 
reach its full fault value. The intermittent fault is only in the negative direction due to the expected 
characteristic of this type of sensor failure and the applied time period varies over 2 to 15 time steps. 
Sensor faults are added to the system in the respective Channel A or Channel B subsystem shown in 
Figure 2. The faults will be inserted for both a takeoff flight condition and a cruise flight condition, 
shown in Table 4. The fault magnitudes tested are 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30, for each sensor and each 
channel (6 sensor types and 2 channels). 
To test and demonstrate the benefit of the analytical redundancy checks, a baseline approach 
consisting of the reasonableness checks is compared to the full SDQ algorithm containing both the 
reasonableness and analytical redundancy checks. These algorithms were implemented and evaluated in 
the qualification and consolidation subsystem shown in Figure 2, and the results were documented in a 
confusion matrix using the Table 4 flight conditions. The rows of the confusion matrix represent the 
actual faulty sensor and the columns represent the detected and isolated fault. Ideally, the confusion 
matrix would represent an identity matrix where the diagonal would be equal to 1.0, 100 percent detection 
and isolation, corresponding to perfect detection and isolation of the fault. Note that SDQ was tuned for a 
15 percent magnitude fault; therefore if SDQ only detects and isolates sensor faults 15 percent faults, 
then the correct diagnosis rate should be 57 percent (4 of the 7 fault magnitudes considered). 
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Figure 6.—Sensor fault input profiles. The input profiles show the 
percentage of the actual fault magnitude as a function of time. The 
drift failure was randomly chosen such that its derivative is below the 
sensor rate failure check limit. 
 
TABLE 4.—THE SENSOR DATA QUALIFICATION TESTING FLIGHT CONDITIONS 
 Takeoff Cruise 
Altitude, ft 791 33200 
Mach number 0.165 0.725 
Delta ambient temperature, °R 0 0 
Engine degradation End of life 50 hr engine 
Throttle low, degrees 42 56 
Throttle high, degrees 80 68 
 
The confusion matrix for a step fault added to the simulation for the baseline data qualification 
approach is shown in Table 5. Note that in there is an additional column labeled “No,” which is the case 
in which the fault is undetected and allows the rows to sum to 1.0. All the step faults can be correctly 
detected 
89 percent of the time. Note that when the fault is inserted into the Channel B sensors, the 
Channel B Detected and Isolated Faults are exactly the same as the Channel A detected and isolated faults 
for a Channel A actual fault. In addition, the Channel B detected and isolated faults for a Channel A 
Actual Fault are exactly the same as the Channel A detected and isolated faults for a Channel B actual 
fault. Therefore, only the results for the actual Channel A faults will be shown for the rest of the paper, 
since it clearly captures the performance. The confusion matrix for a Channel A step fault added to the 
SDQ simulation is shown in Table 6. All the step faults can be correctly detected 
89 percent of the time, 
however the SDQ algorithm can correctly detect Ps3 and T50 faults better than the baseline. During 
testing, it was observed that the step faults are detected by the range checks and analytical redundancy 
checks. The rate checks were able to flag the step change in the incoming data, however since the 
transition occurred in one time step, the rate check would only flag the measurement for one time step and 
is not enough to meet the persistency requirement.  
Another method to compare the baseline and SDQ data qualification techniques is to analyze the size 
of the fault when the fault is detected (detection magnitude) and the time from when the failure occurs to 
when the failure is detected (time to detection). A comparison of these two metrics for the Nf step sensor 
failure, for both channels, all the tested flight conditions, and fault magnitude sizes, is shown in Figure 7. 
Figure 7 shows that the sensor step fault detection occurs in one time step (0.015 sec) for both 
approaches, further indicating that the step change (common to both approaches) is responsible for 
detecting a step sensor failure. 
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TABLE 5.—CONFUSION MATRIX FOR A STEP SENSOR FAULT WITH THE BASELINE APPROACH 
 
 
TABLE 6.—CONFUSION MATRIX FOR A STEP SENSOR FAULT IN CHANNEL A WITH SDQ 
 
 Detected and Isolated Faults 
Channel A Channel B  
Nf Nc Ps3 P50 T30 T50 Nf Nc Ps3 P50 T30 T50 No 
A
ct
ua
l F
au
lt 
 
Nf 0.982 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 
Nc 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ps3 0.000 0.000 0.893 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.107 
P50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.929 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.071 
T30 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.911 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.054 
 
 
 
Figure 7.—Plot comparing the Nf step sensor fault detection 
magnitude (size of the fault when detected) and the time to 
detection for both the baseline and SDQ approaches. 
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 Detected and Isolated Faults 
Channel A Channel B 
No Nf Nc Ps3 P50 T30 T50 Nf Nc Ps3 P50 T30 T50 
A
ct
ua
l F
au
lt C
ha
nn
el
 A
 Nf 0.982 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 
Nc 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ps3 0.000 0.000 0.857 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.143 
P50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.929 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.071 
T30 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.893 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.107 
C
ha
nn
el
 B
 Nf 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.982 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 Nc 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ps3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.857 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.143 
P50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.929 0.000 0.000 0.071 
T30 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
T50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.893 0.107 
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The confusion matrix for a sensor drift fault for both the baseline approach and SDQ is shown in 
Table 7. The baseline approach could only detect 18 percent of the Nf, Nc, and T30 slow sensor drift 
failures. The Table 7 results indicate that SDQ provides detection rates of 
75 percent for the rotor speed 
faults, 
51 percent for the pressure sensors and 
33 percent for the temperature sensors. In regards to 
SDQ, the slow sensor drift fault, applied in this study, is detected by either the range check when the drift 
causes the sensor value to exceed an operational limit, or the analytical redundancy check. 
Figure 8 compares the baseline and SDQ data qualification techniques for the detection magnitude 
and time to detection for the Nf sensor drift failure, for all the tested flight conditions and fault magnitude 
sizes. Figure 8 shows the SDQ technique is able to identify sensor drift failures at magnitudes between 2 
to 10 percent at times between 10 to 52 sec, but is unable to detect the 1 percent sensor drift failures. The 
data shown in Figure 8 along with the confusion matrix shown in Table 7, demonstrates the benefit of 
adding the analytical redundancy network over just the reasonableness checks. 
 
TABLE 7.—CONFUSION MATRIX FOR A SLOW SENSOR DRIFT FAULT FOR 
CHANNEL A COMPARING THE BASELINE APPROACH AND SDQ 
  
Detected and Isolated Faults 
Channel A Channel B 
No Nf Nc Ps3 P50 T30 T50 Nf Nc Ps3 P50 T30 T50 
A
ct
ua
l F
au
lt B
as
el
in
e 
Nf 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.982 
Nc 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.982 
Ps3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
P50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
T30 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.982 
T50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SD
Q
 
Nf 0.768 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.214 
Nc 0.000 0.750 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.250 
Ps3 0.000 0.000 0.607 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.286 
P50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.518 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.393 
T30 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.357 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.179 0.000 0.464 
T50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.339 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.179 0.482 
 
 
Figure 8.—Plot comparing the Nf sensor drift fault detection 
magnitude (size of the fault when detected) and the time to 
detection for both the baseline and SDQ approaches. 
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The confusion matrix for an intermittent fault is shown in Table 8, where both the baseline and SDQ 
approach can correctly identify a fault 
78 percent. During the development and testing, it was observed 
that detecting the intermittent fault, especially the one designed for this work, is a function of the rate 
check. The intermittent fault applied in this work changes quickly, but can range from 2 to 15 time steps. 
Figure 9 compares the detection magnitude and time to detection for the Nf intermittent sensor failures, 
which shows that both the baseline and SDQ techniques perform the same, which should be expected 
since both techniques use the same rate check algorithm.  
 
TABLE 8.—CONFUSION MATRIX FOR A INTERMITTENT SENSOR FAULT FOR CHANNEL 
A COMPARING THE BASELINE APPROACH AND SDQ 
 
 Detected and Isolated Faults 
Channel A Channel B 
Nf Nc Ps3 P50 T30 T50 Nf Nc Ps3 P50 T30 T50 No 
A
ct
ua
l F
au
lt B
as
el
in
e 
Nf 0.964 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.036 
Nc 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ps3 0.000 0.000 0.786 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.214 
P50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.893 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.107 
T30 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.857 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.143 
SD
Q
 
Nf 0.964 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.036 
Nc 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ps3 0.000 0.000 0.786 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.214 
P50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.893 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.107 
T30 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.857 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.143 
 
 
Figure 9.—Plot comparing the Nf intermittent sensor fault detection 
magnitude (size of the fault when detected) and the time to detection 
for both the baseline and SDQ approaches. 
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To determine if these findings are truly representative for the range of flight conditions that SDQ was 
designed for, confusion matrices for 26 random takeoff conditions and 26 random cruise conditions 
comparing the Baseline and SDQ techniques are shown in Tables 9 and 10, respectively. The total 
number of flight conditions during takeoff and cruise, 26, was arbitrarily selected. For each of the flight 
conditions, all the sensor faults were simulated and one flight with no faults was simulated to determine if 
there were any false positives. For all the flight conditions tests, there were no false positives identified 
(no sensor was disqualified when a fault was not present). The data in Tables 9 and 10 confirm that the  
results represent the SDQ performance over the broader range of flight conditions, the clear advantage of 
adding in analytical redundancy by the improved detection rate, and that there is some difficulty in 
sensing temperature sensor faults compared to rotor speed and pressure sensor faults. 
 
 
TABLE 9.—CONFUSION MATRIX FOR 26 RANDOM CRUISE CONDITIONS 
 
 Detected and Isolated Faults 
Channel A Channel B  
Nf Nc Ps3 P50 T30 T50 Nf Nc Ps3 P50 T30 T50 No 
A
ct
ua
l F
au
lt B
as
el
in
e 
Nf 0.600 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.400 
Nc 0.000 0.600 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.400 
Ps3 0.000 0.000 0.503 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.497 
P50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.514 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.486 
T30 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.600 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.400 
T50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.514 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.486 
SD
Q
 
Nf 0.890 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.082 
Nc 0.000 0.916 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.084 
Ps3 0.000 0.000 0.774 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.215 
P50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.735 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.265 
T30 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.742 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.258 
T50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.646 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.354 
 
 
TABLE 10.—CONFUSION MATRIX FOR 26 RANDOM TAKEOFF CONDITIONS 
 
 Detected and Isolated Faults 
Channel A Channel B  
Nf Nc Ps3 P50 T30 T50 Nf Nc Ps3 P50 T30 T50 No 
A
ct
ua
l F
au
lt B
as
el
in
e 
Nf 0.579 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.421 
Nc 0.000 0.608 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.392 
Ps3 0.000 0.000 0.497 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.503 
P50 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.576 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.410 
T30 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.621 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.379 
T50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.536 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.464 
SD
Q
 
Nf 0.880 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.119 
Nc 0.000 0.892 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.108 
Ps3 0.000 0.000 0.730 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.129 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.142 
P50 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.763 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.000 0.146 
T30 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.737 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.145 0.000 0.118 
T50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.691 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.158 0.151 
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VI. Concluding Remarks 
This work focused on applying a previously developed sensor validation strategy, Sensor Data 
Qualification (SDQ), developed for automated and human in the loop space systems to a commercial 
aircraft engine simulation, the Commercial Modular Aero-Propulsion System Simulation 40,000 
(C-MAPSS40k). The applied SDQ application is a multi-layered approach that contains three different 
types of checks for diagnosing sensor faults—range checks, rate checks, and analytical redundancy 
checks applied in the form of sensor networks that capture the relationships between sensors. Range 
checks protect against a gross sensor fault in which the sensed value exceeds some known minimum or 
maximum value for the sensor. Rate checks protect against a fast drifting or extremely noisy sensor 
measurement by checking the derivative of the signal against a known maximum value based on the 
engine and sensor dynamics. The main feature of the SDQ application was the development of a sensor 
network intended to detect small magnitude sensor bias drifts of a low rate of change. The advantage of 
using the sensor network was shown by comparing the results of the SDQ application to a Baseline 
application which did not feature the sensor network. The sensor network approach excelled for the slow 
sensor drifts faults and also improved the sensor step change failures but showed no advantage with the 
intermittent sensor failure which is more dependent on the rate checks. The SDQ application was shown 
to be able to do an adequate job in detecting faults in rotor speed sensors and pressures, but the ability to 
detect small magnitude faults in the temperature sensors was shown to be more difficult. Further work 
could include integrating SDQ with system health management technologies to determine if there is a 
benefit to an integrated approach. 
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